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Judicial Interpretation of the Scottish Juvenile 
Justice System: Fostering or Frustrating the Welfare 
Model? 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In 1961 the Secretary of State for Scotland 1 appointed the Honorable Lord 
Kilbrandon2 to chair a committee3 to evaluate the powers and procedures of the 
Scottish courts4 treating juvenile delinquents" and juveniles in need of care or 
protection. 6 At the time of the Committee's formation,juvenile crime in Scotland 
1. The Secretary of State for Scotland, a government minister, maintains various administrative 
responsibilities for Scottish affairs. Among the Secretary's duties are the administration of health, 
education, housing, roads, and the courts. Traditionally, the Secretary of State is always a member of 
the House of Commons. F.M. MARTIN, SJ. Fox & K. MURRAY, CHILDREN OUT OF COURT 16 n.4 (1981) 
[hereinafter cited as CHILDREN OUT OF COURT]. 
2. Charles James Dalrymple Shaw, Baron of Kilbrandon. Lord Kilbrandon, a noted Scottish advo-
cate, served as Dean of the Faculty of Advocates at Edinburg University (1957), as a sheriff of the 
Sheriff Court (1954-57), and as Chair of the Standing Consultative Council on Youth Service in 
Scotland (1960-68). Lord Kilbrandon was a member of the College of Justice, the Scottish Law 
Commission, the Court of Session, and the House of Lords. WHO'S WHO: AN ANNUAL BIOGRAPHICAL 
DICTIONARY 1246 (l35th ed. 1983-84). 
3. In addition to Lord Kilbrandon, the committee members included two judges of the Sheriff Court, 
three magistrates with experience in the juvenile courts, a juvenile court clerk, a professor of law, a child 
psychiatrist, a secondary school headmaster, an approved school manager, and a senior county chief 
constable. Kilbrandon, Children in Trouble, 6 BRIT. J. CRIMINOLOGY, DELINQ. AND DEVIANT SOC. BEHAV-
IOR 112, 113-14 (1966). For a definition of "approved school", see infra note 208. 
4. Although Parliament is the sole legislative body for the United Kingdom, Scotland maintains its 
own court system, sharing with the English system only the House of Lords, the highest level of civil 
appellate review in the United Kingdom. CHILDREN OUT OF COURT,supra note I, at 1. The High Court 
of Justiciary is the highest Scottish Criminal Court and has both original and appellate jurisdiction. I d. at 
16 n.8. When hearing civil matters, judges of the High Court of Justiciary sit as the Court of Session. /d. 
Below the High Court of Justiciary and the Court of Session are the Sheriff Courts, which deal with 
the majority of both civil and criminal cases in Scotland. Id. A sheriff, an experienced legal practitioner 
with a permanent Crown appointment, presides over the Sheriff Court. Id. 
Prior to 1975, the Burgh Courts, or Police Courts, dealt with minor offenses and were presided over 
by lay magistrates who were generally senior officials of the local authorities. Id. at 16 nn.8-9. In 1975, 
when the Scottish local governments were reorganized into regional authorities, these courts were 
replaced by new District Courts. Id. The equivalent of the Burgh Courts in rural Scotland were the 
Justice of the Peace U.P.) Courts. Fox,JuvenileJustice Reform: InnlJVations in Scotland, 12 AM. CRIM. L. 
REV. 61, 63 (1974). 
5. The Kilbrandon Committee never specifically defined the term "delinquent," but used it generally 
to refer to children who have deficiencies in their upbringing. CHILDREN OUT OF COURT, supra note I, at 
4. 
6. In general, children in need of care or protection are children who lack fit guardianship; who have 
been abused, neglected, or victimized; who are beyond control; or who are "exposed to moral danger." 
See Children and Young Persons (Scotland) Act, 1937, I Geo. 6, ch. 37, § 65. See also REPORT OF THE 
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had been increasing at an accelerated rate/ and the then-existing juvenile court 
system was unable to handle the heavy caseload that resulted from this increase.8 
The Kilbrandon Committee studied both the structure of several juvenile 
justice systems and possible remedies for juvenile delinquency.9 The Committee 
concluded that delinquency originated in the home during the child-rearing 
process,IO and that an effective remedy for delinquency was not punishment but 
rather social treatment. II It further concluded that social treatment should not 
be administered through the juvenile court system, since the court system is 
geared primarily to fact-finding and the administration of punishment. 12 The 
Committee recommended that while the fact-finding power should remain in 
the Scottish courts, Parliament should create a separate forum to administer 
treatment to both juvenile offenders and juveniles in need of care or protec-
tion. 13 Finally, the Committee realized that cooperation of the child's family was 
essential to effective treatment,14 and accordingly, it expressed concern that the 
new system appear just from the public'S perspective. 15 
The Kilbrandon Committee published its report in April 1964.16 Its recom-
mendations for reform precipitated the publication of a White Paperl7 and the 
subsequent passage of a parliamentary act l8 creating the Children's Hearings 
System as a replacement for the ailing juvenile court system. 19 The Secretary of 
State issued the Children's Hearings (Scotland) Rules,20 which, together with the 
provisions of the Act, defined the powers, duties, responsibilities, and proce-
dures ofthe system.21 The Children's Hearings System became effective in April 
1971 22 with the passage of the Sheriff Court Procedure Rules. 23 
COMMITTEE ON CHILDREN AND YOUNG PERSONS (SCOTLAND), CMND. No. 2306, ~ 8 (1964) [hereinafter 
cited as KILBRANDON REPORT). 
7. Grant, The Children's Hearing System in Scotland: Its Strengths and Weaknesses, 10 IRISH JURIST 24, 25 
(1975). 
8. Fox, supra note 4, at 64. 
9. KILBRANDON REPORT, supra note 6, ~~ 2-3. 
10. Id. ~~ 15, 87. 
11. See id. ~~ 12-15. 
12. Id. ~~ 52, 71. 
13. See id. ~ 72. 
14. Id. ~ 17. 
15. Fox, supra note 4, at 67-68. 
16. KILBRANDON REPORT, supra note 6. 
17. SOCIAL WORK AND THE COMMUNITY, CMND. No. 3065 (1966). 
18. Social Work (Scotland) Act 1968, ch.49 [hereinafter cited as Act). 
19. Bruce, Historical Background in THE SCOTTISH JUVENILE JUSTICE SYSTEM 3, 8-12 (F.M. Martin & K. 
Murrayeds. 1982). 
20. Children's Hearings (Scotland) Rules 1971, STAT. INST. 19711492. 
21. Bruce, supra note 19, at 12. 
22. Murray, Structure and Operations in THE SCOTTISH JUVENILE JUSTICE SYSTEM 13, 13 (F.M. Martin & 
K. Murray eds. 1982); Grant, supra note 7, at 24. 
23. Act of Sederunt (Social Work) (Sheriff Court Procedure Rules), STAT. INST. 1971192 [hereinafter 
cited as Sheriff Court Procedure Rules). 
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The Children's Hearings System centers around the reporter,24 who receives 
referrals and initiates contact with the family.25 The reporter decides whether to 
bring the parents and child before a children's hearing, a three-person lay panel 
composed of members of the local community.26 If the family comes before a 
hearing, the hearing members and the family discuss the facts of the child's 
situation,27 and the hearing decides the appropriate treatment. 28 If the case 
involves disputed facts, the hearing will direct the reporter to take the case 
before the sheriff for a finding of fact before the hearing considers treatment.29 
As a forum for administering treatment, a children's hearing is not empowered 
to decide questions of fact. 30 
Since the system began to operate, its effectiveness has been evaluated ideolog-
ically,3! empirically, 32 and comparatively.33 Judicial evaluation, however, was not 
immediately forthcoming because, under the new system, only a handful of 
juvenile cases reached the appellate court level each year. 34 Of the cases that have 
reached the Court of Session in the fourteen-year life of the system, most have 
concerned questions of procedure.35 The Court of Session, in its attempt to 
standardize procedure throughout the hearings system, frequently considered 
questions in the context of the foundations of the Kilbrandon Committee's 
treatment model.36 Despite such consideration, the Court of Session's opinions 
have sometimes fostered, yet sometimes frustrated, the treatment model of 
24. Finlayson, The Reporter in CHILDREN'S HEARINGS 48, 48 (F.M. Martin & K. Murray eds. 1976). 
25. See id. at 48-49. 
26. [d. at 49. The term "hearing" has a dual meaning in the context of the Scottish system. It refers to 
a group of three lay persons who meet with the family, reporter, and social worker to discuss the case. It 
also refers to the actual meeting at which the case is discussed and evaluated. Murray, supra note 22, at 
15 n.·. 
In its report, the Kilbrandon Committee used the term "panel" to refer to the three lay persons, 
KILBRANDON REPORT, supra note 6, ~ 74, but in the present hearings system "panel" refers to the pool of 
specially trained lay persons whose members conduct the hearings. See infra notes 154-69 and accom-
panying text. 
27. Fox, supra note 4, at 87-88. 
28. Act, supra note 18, §§ 43, 44. For a discussion of available treatment alternatives see infra notes 
205-14 and accompanying text. 
29. Act, supra note 18, § 42(2)(c). 
30. See id. 
31. See generally S. ASQUITH, CHILDREN AND JUSTICE: DECISION-MAKING IN CHILDREN'S HEARINGS AND 
JUVENILE COURTS (1983); May, Rhetoric and Reality: The Consequences of Unacknuwledged Ambiguity in the 
Children's Panel System, 17 BRIT. J. CRIMINOLOGY 209 (1977); Morris, Scottish Juvenile Justice: A Critique in 
CRIME, CRIMINOLOGY AND PUBUC POUCY 347 (R. Hood ed. 1974). 
32. See generally S. ASQUITH, supra note 31; CHILDREN OUT OF COURT, supra note I. 
33. See generally S. ASQUITH, supra note 31; Rink,Juvenile Status Offenders: A Comparative Analysis, 8 
HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL'y. 151 (1982) (comparison of the handling of juvenile status offenders in 
Scotland and the Commonwealth of Massachusetts). 
34. Forshaw, Views From the Bridges, 1982 SCOTS LAW TIMES [S.L.T.] (News) 193, 200. 
35. E.g., J.F. and Others v. McGregor, 1981 S.L.T. 334; McGregor v. D., 1977 S.L.T. 182; Kennedy 
v. B. and Another, 1973 S.L.T. 38; H. v. McGregor, 1973 S.L.T. 110. 
36. See, e.g., McGregor v. D., 1977 S.L.T. at 185-86; Kennedy v. B., 1973 S.L.T. 40; H. v. McGregor, 
1973 S.L.T. 110. 
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juvenile justice. Because of the occasional adverse effects on the hearings system, 
Parliament has acted in at least one instance37 to reduce the adverse conse-
quences of the Court of Session's opinions while preserving the positive conse-
quences which foster justice within the treatment model. 
This Comment focuses on the effect of some of the major Scottish court 
opinions handed down over the fourteen years since the implementation of the 
Children's Hearings System. The Comment first discusses the need for reform 
under the former juvenile court system. The Kilbrandon Committee's sug-
gestions for reform, as well as the procedural system actually implemented to 
accomplish this reform, will be examined. Next, the Comment examines the 
circumstances and opinions of some of the major court cases concerning pro-
cedural issues within the Children's Hearing System. The Comment then ana-
lyzes whether the holdings in these cases have fostered or frustrated the reform 
envisioned by the Kilbrandon Committee. 
II. BACKGROUND: THE JUVENILE COURT SYSTEM PRIOR TO 1971 
Prior to 1971, Scotland maintained a traditional court system to handle 
juvenile offenses.38 The High Court of Justiciary39 presided over serious crimes 
involving children, including murder, treason, rape, and incest; a network of 
lower courts40 heard less serious juvenile cases.41 Despite provisions in the Chil-
dren and Young Persons (Scotland) Act empowering the Secretary of State to 
establish specialized juvenile courts,42 the Secretary created such courts in only 
four areas of Scotland.43 
By 1962, the Sheriff Courts,44 sitting as juvenile courts, heard approximately 
32 percent of the juvenile cases in Scotland.45 The Burgh Courts46 heard up to 45 
percent of the juvenile cases,47 and the Justice of the Peace Courts48 heard about 
7 percent. 49 The Justice of the Peace juvenile courts 50 heard only 16 percent of 
juvenile cases brought into the court system. 51 
37. See Health and Social Services and Social Security Adjudications Act 1983, ch. 41, ~ 8, sched. 2. 
38. Grant, supra note 7, at 24; Rink, supra note 33, at 185. 
39. See supra note 4. 
40. See supra note 4. 
41. Fox, supra note 4, at 63. 
42. Children and Young Persons (Scotland) Act, 1937, 1 Edw. 8 Be: 1 Geo. 6, ch. 37, § 24. These 
juvenile courts were special Justice of the Peace courts with jurisdiction to handle juvenile cases. ld. 
43. The four areas having juvenile courts were Ayrshire, Renfrewshire, Fife, and the city of Aber-
deen. KILBRANDON REPORT, supra note 6, ~ 43. 
44. See supra note 4. 
45. KILBRANDON REpORT, supra note 6, ~ 45. 
46. See supra note 4. 
47. KILBRANDON REPORT, supra note 6, ~ 45. 
48. See supra note 4. 
49. KILBRANDON REPORT, suPra note 6, ~ 45. 
50. See supra note 42. 
51. KILBRANDON REPORT, supra note 6, ~ 45. 
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Juvenile crime was increasing at a rate unacceptable to the public,52 and the 
existing system was poorly equipped to handle the problem.53 Because the 
Secretary of State had established very few specialized juvenile courts, 54 juvenile 
cases were being channeled into the Sheriff Courts rather than into other 
summary courtS.55 This trend threatened to clog the Sheriff Courts with 
caseloads that they were ill-equipped to handle. 56 A change in the system was 
necessary to accommodate this increasing volume of cases in the Sheriff Courts, 57 
and the Kilbrandon Committee was appointed to investigate possible solutions. 58 
III. KILBRANDON REPORT: THE ROOTS OF THE SCOTTISH JUVENILE JUSTICE 
SYSTEM 
Soon after its formation in May 1961, the Kilbrandon Committee began its 
task of evaluating the Scottish juvenile justice system. It initially gathered both 
oral and written testimony on the subject from various Scottish social and legal 
organizations.59 In addition, Committee members observed procedures in 
juvenile courts and residential institutions in both Scotland and England, and 
gathered information about Scandinavian welfare boards. 60. As a result of its 
findings, the Committee proposed not merely a modification of the existing 
juvenile court arrangements, but a fundamental change in the organization and 
administration of Scottish juvenile justice.6 ! 
According to the Committee, juvenile court systems, as extensions of the 
criminal law, are geared primarily to the principles of criminal procedure. 62 A 
criminal court's primary functions are to determine the guilt or innocence of the 
accused and, when it finds the accused guilty, to administer the appropriate 
punishment. 63 The system attributes a high degree of personal responsibility to 
52. See, e.g .• 764 PARL. DEB. H.C. (5th seLl 60 (1968) (remarks of Michael Noble, M.P.), cited in Grant, 
supra note 7, at 25 n.6. 
53. See Grant, supra note 7, at 25. 
54. /d. 
55. Fox, supra note 4, at 64. 
56. /d. 
57. ld. One expert speculates that if more local authorities had requested the creation of special 
juvenile courts, the reform that led to the Children's Hearings System would not have been necessary. 
Grant, supra note 7, at 25. 
58. See Grant, supra note 7, at 24-25. 
59. KILBRANDON REPORT, supra note 6, ~ 2. 
60. ld. ~ 3. One example of the Scandinavian system is the child welfare board in Sweden. It is 
empowered to administer treatment to juveniles in the form of probation, warnings to child offenders 
or guardians, placement in residential homes or boarding schools, or assistance and guidance in finding 
suitable employment. O. NYQUIST, JUVENILE JUSTICE: A COMPARATIVE STUDY WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE 
TO THE SWEDISH CHILD WELFARE BOARD AND THE CALIFORNIA JUVENILE COURT SYSTEMS 11 (1960). 
61. Fox, supra note 4, at 65. 
62. KILBRANDON REPORT, supra note 6, ~ 50. 
63. /d. ~ 52. 
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the actor; it assumes a conscious choice between right and wrong, and the actor, 
by choosing to do the wrong, requires punishment.64 
Ajuvenile court, however, is required to consider the welfare of the individual 
before the court when it administers sentences.65 Whereas the criminal adjudica-
tion process focuses on personal responsibility for a specific act, welfare consid-
erations are not necessarily linked to personal responsibility and may involve a 
broad range of factors. 66 Sentencing in ajuvenile court may be punitive in part, 
but, in consideration of the child's welfare, sentencing should also provide a 
measure of treatment to prevent a child's further antisocial behavior.67. 
Although juvenile courts do provide mechanisms for both punishment and 
preventive treatment,6S the Committee believed that the two principles conflicted 
in four ways. First, the crime-responsibility-punishment model utilized by the 
criminal courts resists preventive action against potential delinquents.69 This 
model imposes criminal liability for a particular act, and it maintains a high 
standard of proof of guilt because it is concerned with punishment rather than 
preventive treatment. 70 The punishment administered by the system carries a 
stigma in the public eye as an evaluation of a criminal's worth, the worth tested 
by the high standard of proof.71 Therefore, any preventive action taken by a 
juvenile court to aid potential delinquents who have not been convicted of a 
crime risks labeling them with the stigma of a criminal offender. 72 
Second, the Committee believed punishment to be a narrow concept that 
cannot apply beyond the person or persons guilty of committing the criminal 
act. 73 Treatment, however, may be administered not only to the individual 
offender, but to others whose potentially altered behavior might affect the 
behavior of the offender. 74 
Third, because the punishment must fit the crime under the crime-
responsibility-punishment principle, the Committee felt that ordering punish-
ment might inhibit the court in ordering treatment for the offender.75 Treat-
ment under welfare principles, however, need not be directly related to the 
criminal act,76 and may apply to situations beyond the reach of punishment. 77 
64. Id. 11 51. 
65. Id. 11 50. 
66. Id. 11 55. 
67. Id. 11 52. 
68. For example, the Committee acknowledged a recent trend toward sentencing that focuses on 
educating and reforming the offender. Id. 11 52. 
69. Id. 11 54(1). 
70.ld. 
71. Id. 
72. Id. 
73. Id. 11 54(2). 
74. /d. 
75. Id. 11 54(3). 
76. As an example of the way in which a criminal court may be bound by the nature of a criminal 
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Fourth, the Committee recognized that punishment is administered one time, 
at the court sentencing.78 Since the acts that have merited such punishment have 
been done and cannot be altered, the punishment itself is unalterable.79 Treat-
ment measures, on the other hand, offer a flexible approach which may be 
altered over the course of time in response to the changing circumstances and 
the changing needs of the individua1.80 The Committee concluded that it was 
"inconceivable that a court could ever guarantee to have chosen, at the moment 
of commencement of its sentence, the exact treatment - to be given perhaps 
over a period of several years - appropriate to the individual person before 
it."81 
The Committee also noted that general principles of criminal law have been 
modified with respect to juveniles.82 Perhaps the most important modification is 
the recognition that, because children differ from adults in their moral and 
intellectual capacity to distinguish right from wrong, the criminal responsibility 
of youth should be mitigated.83 Youth limits the degree to which children can be 
held personally responsible for criminal acts.84 A second modification is the 
recognition that a court may consider all of the circumstances surrounding the 
juvenile offender, including future events, rather than administer punishment 
strictly on the basis of the offense.85 A third modification demonstrates concern 
about the motives and causes of juvenile crime, and attempts to eliminate the 
source of the crime, rather than merely to punish the offender.86 Characteristic 
of the concept of preventive treatment, these three considerations emphasize the 
need for an institution that can effectively implement preventive treatment to 
cope with the problem of juvenile crime.87 
In concluding its observations about juvenile courts, the Committee agreed 
that the shortcomings of the Scottish system existed because the juvenile courts 
sought "to combine the characteristics of a court of criminal law with those of a 
specialised agency for the treatment of juvenile offenders, proceeding on a 
offense, and therefore unable to order effective treatment, the Committee described the case in which 
an offender is before the court for a relatively minor offense, yet the surrounding circumstances show 
that long-term social treatment would be in the offender's best interest. The court would be unable to 
impose a long sentence for a minor offense, and may even be required to impose a lighter-than-normal 
punishment because of the offender's situation. Id. ~ 54(3). 
77.Id. 
78. Id. ~ 54(4). 
79.Id. 
80. See. id. 
81. Id. 
82. Id. ~ 55. 
83. Id. ~ 55(1). 
84.Id. 
85. Id. ~ 55(2). 
86. Id. ~ 55(3). 
87. See id. ~ 56. 
88. /d. ~ 71. 
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preventive and educational principle."88 The Committee proposed that Parlia-
ment abolish the juvenile court system and replace it with a specialized agency 
that would hold children's hearings and administer treatment to juveniles. 89 The 
agency would not be empowered to make findings of fact, and would administer 
treatment only in cases where the facts surrounding the child's situation had 
already been established.90 
As the Committee envisioned the procedure, the child and parents would 
attend an initial hearing which would inquire into the family's understanding of 
the facts and allegations in the referral. 91 If the family understood and acknowl-
edged as true the facts in the referral, the hearing would then proceed to 
consider treatment measures.92 If either the parents or the child did not under-
stand or accept the facts as stated, the hearing would refer the case to the sheriff 
court to determine the facts of the case.93 Upon completion of the fact-finding 
process, the case would return to the hearing for treatment consideration. 94 
Under this proposed system, the fact-finding forum would remain separate 
and distinct from the treatment forum. 95 The hearing could proceed with treat-
ment only if the facts were not disputed, or had been determined by a court of 
law.96 The courts, if necessary, would be involved in the proceedings only to 
determine the facts or legal issues in question; decisions involving treatment 
would be left to the hearing. 91 The Committee recommended that the hearing 
itself be composed of lay members who had been instructed as to the purpose 
and procedure of the system.98 
The proposed system would accommodate both juveniles who had committed 
offenses and children in need of care or protection, because treatment of both 
groups depends upon the application of preventive measures, which the hearing 
is equipped to impose.99 The Kilbrandon Committee believed that the problems 
of both children in need of care and protection and delinquent children could 
most often be attributed to "shortcomings in the normal 'bringing-up' process-
in the home, in the family environment, and in the schools."lo0 Since these 
problems originate from the same source and share common treatment meth-
ods, [O[ the Committee saw the inclusion of the two groups of children within the 
89. [d. 11 73. 
90. /d. 
91. [d. 
92. [d. 
93. [d. 
94. [d. 
95. [d. 
96. [d. 
97. [d. 
98. [d. 1111 74, 75. 
99. [d. 1111 15, 72-79. 
100. [d. 11 87; see also Kilbrandon, supra note 3, at 115-16. 
101. K'LBRANDON REPORT, supra note 6, 11 15; Kilbrandon, supra note 3, at 115-16. 
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same procedural system as a realistic acceptance of the common source of their 
problems and as a realistic approach to treating both groups of children. 102 
A final concern of the Kilbrandon Committee was that the proposed system 
appear to do justice in the eyes of the parents and children whom it purported to 
serve. I03 The Committee recognized that the cooperation of both children and 
their parents was essential to providing effective preventive treatment. I04 Obser-
vance of the strict proportionality approach to sentencingl05 may at times lead to 
unduly severe punishment for juvenile misbehavior. 106 Abidance by this ap-
proach also may hold a child responsible for misbehavior learned from the 
antisocial attitudes of the parents, as well as preclude consideration of the child's 
best interest. 107 In order to maintain the support and cooperation of those whom 
it seeks to serve, the hearing system strives to minimize the confusion and 
misconceptions surrounding the decision-making process so that the decisions 
appear just from the participants' perspective. 108 Once the participants have 
102. KILBRANDON REPORT, supra note 6, If 87. 
One of the harshest and most frequent criticisms of the Kilbrandon Report arises from its rather 
simplistic assumption that the roots of juvenile problems lie almost solely with the family and the child 
rearing process. May, supra note 31, at 222-24; Morris, supra note 31, at 360·64. Despite its goal of 
creating a system to eliminate the source of delinquency, the Committee documents neither research on 
the origin of delinquency nor any attempt to synthesize some of the many criminological theories of 
juvenile justice. May, supra note 31, at 222. Instead, the Committee assumes that the family is at the 
source of the problem and structures a system that reaches to this perceived source through family 
participation in the hearing and the treatment measures. Id. at 223-24. If, in fact, the family does not 
cause delinquency, as some theories of criminology suggest, treatment administered by the hearing may 
be irrelevant, or even counter-productive. Id. at 224. For further discussion, see May, Delinquency 
Control and the Treatment Model: Some Implications of Recent Legislation, 2 BRIT. J. CRIMINOLOGY 359 (1971). 
The Committee has also received criticism for assuming too readily that juvenile offenders and 
children in need of care or protection were merely different manifestations of the same underlying 
problems. Morris, supra note 31, at 363. Although both types of problems share some common sources, 
at least one study has shown that juvenile delinquency is primarily linked to social disorganization, such 
as overcrowded living conditions and high infant mortality rates, while child mistreatment is frequently 
linked to family disorganization, such as separated nuclear families and trauma between parents and 
children. Philip & McCulloch, Uses of Social Indicators in Psychiatric Epidemiology, 20 BRIT. J. PREVo Soc. 
MED. 122 (1966), noted in Morris, supra note 31, at 364. In formulating a social institution to penetrate 
both types of problems, the Kilbrandon Committee's decision to obscure these differences rather than 
to highlight them seems contrary to its goal of developing an effective remedy for the problems. Given 
the resources of the hearings system, however, the practical consequences may be immaterial. Morris, 
supra note 31, at 364. 
103. Fox, supra note 4, at 67-68. 
104. KILBRANDON REPORT, supra note 6, If 17; Fox, supra note 4, at 67. 
105. The strict proportionality approach contemplates that the severity of the punishment be 
determined by the severity of the offense. See KILBRANDON REPORT, supra note 6, If 54(3). 
106. Fox, supra note 4, at 67; see KII.BRANDON REPORT, supra note 6, If 56. 
107. Fox, supra note 4, at 67; see KILBRANDON REPORT, supra note 6, If 56. 
108. Fox, supra note 4, at 68. 
The Committee realized, however, that eradication of all negative feelings toward the system is not 
possible because some clients of the system will inevitably see any type of public interference as a 
punishment. KILBRANDON REPORT, supra note 6, If 57. At best, the Committee hoped to "reduc[e] 
considerably such conflicts in the eyes of the parents, if less frequently in the eyes of the child." Id. 
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gained confidence and trust in the system, they will be more willing to accept the 
social treatment offered on behalf of the child's welfare. 109 
Thus, the Kilbrandon Committee concluded that social treatment, and not 
punishment, was an effective tool for coping with juvenile delinquency. Because 
a criminal court is primarily a fact-finding forum that administers punishment 
based on the facts of the offense, the Committee considered the court system to 
be an inappropriate institution for administering treatment. Instead, the Com-
mittee recommended the separation of the fact-finding forum from the treat-
ment forum, and placed the power to administer treatment to both juvenile 
offenders and juveniles in need of care or protection within a lay system of 
children's hearings. 
IV. OPERATION OF THE CHILDREN'S HEARINGS SYSTEM 
The Kilbrandon Committee submitted its findings and recommendations in 
1964.110 In 1966 a White Paper, Social Work and the Community, proposed essen-
tially the same system of children's hearings as were originally set forth in the 
Kilbrandon Report. llI In 1968, Parliament passed the Social Work (Scotland) 
Act. 112 Part III of the the Act established the Children's Hearings System. 113 The 
Secretary of State implemented the Children's Hearings (Scotland) Rules,1I4 and 
when the Sheriff Court Procedure Rules l15 became effective, the system became 
operational in 1971. 116 Although the Act and rules provided the legal frame-
109. See Fox, The Handling of Juvenik Delinquents in Scotland: Evaluation of the System by an American 
Observer, 18 INT'L. J. OFFENDER THERAPY AND COMPo CRIMINOLOGY 267, 269 (1974). 
110. KILBRANDON REPORT, supra note 6, ~ I. 
Ill. See SOCIAL WORK AND THE COMMUNITY,supra note 17, ~~ 56-75. The Killbrandon Report and the 
White Paper differed slightly in their proposal for social services reorganization. See Morris, supra note 
31, at 354. Compare KILBRANDON REPORT, supra note 6, ~~ 232-251 (proposal for formation of a social 
education department) with SOCIAL WORK AND THE COMMUNITY, supra note 17, at ~~ 8-1I, 18-55 
(organization of a new social work department). The White Paper also suggested that panel members be 
drawn from a wide circle of classes and occupations, so as to bring to the panel views and experiences 
which were representative of those of the community. May, supra note 31, at 213; see SOCIAL WORK AND 
THE COMMUNITY, supra note 17, ~ 76-81. 
Despite the attempt to maintain a diversity among panel members, the result of the selection process 
has been the appointment of a rather homogeneous group with respect to social and educational 
backgrounds, and cultural and moral values. See May, supra note 31, at 212. For further discussion 
concerning the problems associated with panel recruitment and selection see May & Smith, The 
Appointment of the Aberdeen City Children's Panel: A Comment on the Social Work (Scotland) Act 1968, I BRIT. J. 
Soc. WORK 7 (1971); Mapstone, The Selection of the Children's Panelfor the County of Fife: A Case Study, 2 
BRIT. J. SOC. WORK 445-69 (1972); A. Rowe, INITIAL SELECTION FOR CHILDREN'S PANELS IN SCOTLAND 
(1972). 
112. See supra note 18. 
113. Murray, supra note 22, at 13. 
114. See supra note 20. 
115. See supra note 23. 
116. Bruce, supra note 19, at 12. 
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work 117 under which the system was to operate, they did not offer guidance as to 
how the ideals discussed by the Committee were to be achieved in practice. 11M 
The operation of the Children's Hearings System involves the cooperative 
effort of several agencies and individuals, among them the reporter, the Chil-
dren's Panel Advisory Committee, the children's panel, and the social work 
department. 119 The system is also heavily dependent on the cooperation of the 
police in the initial detection and referral of children in need of treatment. 120 
A. The Reporter 
The central figure in the hearings system is the reporter, 121 who functions as 
the administrator of the hearings system, its advisor on legal matters, and a 
decision-maker with considerable discretion as to which cases are brought before 
a hearing. 122 The reporter is appointed by the regional authority and usually has 
several assistants. 123 Reporters and assistants have varied backgrounds, but most 
have some qualifications either in law or in social work.124 The reporter is 
responsible for the intake of cases, as well as for performing other broad 
administrative duties. 125 In exercising the discretionary powers of the office, the 
reporter has license to adjust the system of juvenile justice to suit the needs of the 
local community.126 
Under the Act,127 a reporter may receive information relating to a child in 
need of care from any source; most frequently, the police provide such informa-
tion with respect to children who have committed offenses. 12M After receiving a 
referral, the reporter must decide whether the circumstances of the referral fit 
one of the preconditions laid down by section 32 of the Act l29 for which interven-
117. An important caveat to the legal framework of the Children's Hearings System is that the Lord 
Advocate, the Crown's senior law officer for Scotland, retains the right to direct the prosecution of 
children in the adult criminal courts. In practice, children are prosecuted only for serious crimes against 
the person. As of 1982, about 1,000 children a year are prosecuted in the criminal courts of Scotland. 
Murray, supra note 22, at 17. 
118. Bruce, supra note 19, at 12. 
119. Murray, supra note 22, at 13. 
120. [d. For a discussion of the role of the police in the Children's Hearings System, see Belt, The 
Police in CHILDREN'S HEARINGS, 43-47 (F.M. Martin & K. Murrayeds. 1976). 
121. Finlayson, supra note 24, at 48; Fox, supra note 4, at 75. 
122. Fox, supra note 4, at 75; Murray, supra note 22, at 13. 
123. Murray, supra note 22; at 13. Each of twelve regional authorities employs a reporter, and almost 
all reporters have several assistants, bringing the total number of reporters and assistants in Scotland to 
about 97 as of 1982. [d. 
124. Fox, supra note 4, at 77-78; Murray, supra note 22, at 13. 
125. Fox, supra note 4, at 75-76. 
126. Finlayson, supra note 24, at 48. 
127. Act, supra note 18, § 37( 1). 
128. Finlayson, supra note 24, at 48. 
129. Section 32 of the Act provides: 
(1) A child may be in need of compulsory measures of care within the meaning of this Part of 
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tion in the child's life is justified. 130 The reporter must also decide whether, given 
the circumstances, the child appears to be in need of compulsory measures of 
care. 131 To assess the circumstances, the reporter may gather information from 
the police, the social work department, the child's school, or any other person or 
agency having information on the child's need for care. 132 
After fully assessing the child's situation, the reporter has three options. 133 The 
reporter may choose to take no further action and subsequently inform the 
child, the parents, and the persons submitting the referral of that decision. 134 If 
some other action appears necessary for the child's benefit, the reporter may 
request that the family accept voluntary guidance and assistance from the social 
work department. 135 Finally, if the family refuses voluntary services, of if more 
stringent treatment seems necessary, the reporter may bring the child to a 
children's hearing. 136 Reporters exercise this third option only when they believe 
that children need compulsory measures of care and when the investigations of 
the children's circumstances reveal sufficient evidence to support at least one 
ground of referral. 137 
this Act if any of the conditions mentioned in the next following subsection is satisfied with 
respect to him. 
(2) The conditions referred to in subsection (I) of this section are that -
(a) he is beyond the control of his parents; or 
(b) through lack of parental care he is falling into bad associations or is exposed to moral 
danger; or 
(c) the lack of care as aforesaid is likely to cause him unnecessary suffering or seriously to 
impair his health or development; or 
(d) any of the offenses mentioned in Schedule I to the Criminal Procedure (Scotland) Act, 
1975 has been committed in respect of him or in respect of a child who is a member ofthe same 
household; or 
(dd) the child is, or is likely to become, a member of the same household as a person who has 
committed any of the offenses mentioned in Schedule I to the Criminal Procedure (Scotland) 
Act, 1975; or 
(e) the child, being a female, is a member of the same household as a female in respect of 
whom an offence which constitutes the crime of incest has been committed by a member of that 
household; or 
(f) he has failed to attend school regularly without reasonable excuse; or 
(g) he has committed an offence; or 
(h) he is a child whose case has been referred to a children's hearing in pursuance of Part V 
of the Act. 
Act, supra note 18, § 32, as amended Children's Act 1975, ch. 72, sched. III. 
Schedule I of the Criminal Procedure (Scotland) Act 1975, ch. 21, mainly concerns sexual offenses 
and offenses constituting cruelty and abuse of children. Part V of the Act concerns children moving to 
Scotland from another part of the United Kingdom who have been referred to a reporter by an 
authority from the area in which the child previously resided. 
130. Murray, supra note 22, at 14. 
131. /d. For a definition of compulsory measure of care see supra note 129. 
132. Murray, supra note 22, at 14. 
133. [d.; Kelly, Children's Hearings: The Handling of Juvenile Delinquents in Scotland, 18 1NT'L J. OF-
FENDER THERAPV AND COMPo CRIMINOLOGV 260, 261 (1974). 
134. Act, supra note 18, § 39(1). 
135. Act, supra note 18, § 39(2); Kelly, supra note 133, at 261; Murray, supra note 22, at 14. 
136. Act, supra note 18, § 39(3); Kelly, supra note 133, at 261; Murray, supra note 22, at 14. 
137. Kelly, supra note 133, at 261-62; Murray, supra note 22, at 14. 
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A reporter who has decided to refer a child to a children's hearing must make 
arrangements with the local authority,138 the panel chair, and the social work 
department (which must provide a social background report for use at the 
hearing). 139 At least seven days before the hearing, the reporter must send the 
child and parents written notice of the time, date, and place of the hearing, along 
with a written statement of the grounds of referral. 140 At least three days prior to 
the hearing, the reporter must make available to the members of the hearing the 
relevant documents, including the grounds for the referral and the social back-
ground report. 141 Hearing members must return all documents to the reporter 
at the conclusion of the hearing. 142 
In addition to making the arrangements, the reporter must attend the hear-
ing. 143 The reporter is responsible for recording the minutes of the proceedings 
at the hearing and for advising hearing members on legal or legally-related 
matters that may arise during the proceedings. 144 
The reporter has the further responsibility to appear in court. 145 The hearing 
may direct the reporter to present evidence to the court in a case with disputed 
facts.146 If the family decides to appeal from a final decision of the hearing, the 
reporter must supply the court with all relevant reports and documents. 147 The 
reporter acts as the respondent to the family's appeal. 148 
Finally, the reporter performs a number of functions not specified by the Act 
but necessary to the efficient operation of the Children's Hearing System. 149 The 
most important of these functions is the maintenance of open communication 
between the reporter's office and the social work department, panel members, 
the police, schools, voluntary agencies, and other offices with which reporters 
work closely.15o Open communication ensures that these offices continue to 
understand and aid the workings of the system. 151 
In sum, the reporter, the central figure of the Children's Hearings System, is 
responsible for the system's initial involvement in all cases. The reporter acts as a 
fact-gatherer, decision-maker, organizer, recorder, and legal advisor. In addi-
tion, the reporter is responsible for the continuous maintenance of the system 
through communication with associated agencies. 
138. Act, supra note 18, § 34(3). 
139. Act, supra note 18, § 39(4); Murray, supra note 22, at 14. 
140. Children's Hearings (Scotland) Rules, supra note 20, rules 7, 8, 14, 15, 27. 
141. [d. rule 6(1). 
142. /d. rule 6(4); Murray, supra note 22, at 15. 
143. Finlayson, supra note 24, at 49. 
144. [d. 
145. [d. 
146. [d. at 50. 
147. [d. 
148. [d. 
149. /d. at 55-56. 
150. [d. 
151. [d. 
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B. The Children's Panel 
Each regional authority has at its disposal a children's panel which provides 
members for a children's hearing. 152 Panel members are nominated by the 
Children's Panel Advisory Committee (CPAC), a regional committee formed to 
recruit and select panel members,153 and are officially appointed by the Secretary 
of State. 154 In 1982, about 1700 adults concurrently served as panel members in 
Scotland; panel sizes ranged from eleven members on the Shetland regional 
panel to over 900 on the Strathclyde regional panel. 155 Panel membership is a 
voluntary public service. 156 
As originally proposed by the Kilbrandon Committee, panel members are 
chosen because of their "personal qualities"157 and not because of their profes-
sional credentials. 158 Desirable qualities include a genuine concern for the wel-
fare of children and a moderate attitude toward treatment, free from tendencies 
toward extreme punitiveness or extreme permissiveness. 159 Because panel selec-
tors look for the same desirable qualities in each panelist that they choose, the 
selection process suggested by the Committee produces a relatively homogene-
ous panel. 160 
The White Paper that followed the Kilbrandon Report suggested that panels 
consist of members with diverse characteristics, 161 who together form a body 
representative of the community.162 Panelists come from a variety of occupa-
tional, income, and age groups.l63 They generally have some experience in 
dealing with children although the responsible authority provides all formal 
training necessary for the position.l 64 The formal training introduces panelists to 
the operation of the hearings system, explains the treatment methods and 
facilities available through the system, and outlines the duties and responsibilities 
of the panel member. 165 Panelists receive both introductory training before 
beginning their service term and in-service training throughout their five year 
terms. l66 The CP AC faces the difficult task of selecting persons with particular 
152. Murray, supra note 22, at 15. 
153. Id. For a further discussion of the composition of the CPAC, see Uf. 
154. /d. 
155. Id. at 15-16. 
156. Murray, The Children's Panel in CHILDREN'S HEARINGS 57 (F.M. Martin & K. Murray eds. 1976) 
[hereinafter cited as Children's Panel]. 
157. KILBRANDON REPORT, supra note 6, 11 74. 
158. Id. 
159. Children's Panel, supra note 156, at 59; Murray, supra note 22, at 16. 
160. May, supra note 31, at 213; see supra note II I. 
161. SOCIAL WORK AND THE COMMUNITY, supra note 17,11 76; see supra note III. 
162. See supra note III; see May, supra note 31, at 213. 
163. SOCIAL WORK AND THE COMMUNITY, supra note 17,11 76. 
164. Id. 11 80; see Murray, supra note 22, at 16. 
165. See Children's Panel, supra note 156, at 64-65. 
166. Murray, supra note 22, at 16. Most regional authorities appoint panelists to five year terms. A 
few authorities, however, give appointments f~r only two or three years. Id. 
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qualities to serve on the children's panels while balancing the panels with 
panelists from different occupations and age groups. 167 
C. Social Work Department 
Created by the Act, the social work department l68 works closely with the 
reporter and panel members within the Children's Hearings System. 169 A social 
worker is responsible for providing background reports on each child brought 
before a hearingYo In addition, a social worker is present at the hearingl71 and 
may participate in the discussion that precedes the panel's decision.172 Finally, 
the social work department administers treatment, whether voluntarily accepted 
by the family or imposed by a hearing. 173 
D. Proceeding Through the System 
Any person reasonably believing that a particular child needs compulsory 
measures of care may refer the case to a reporter. 174 The Act lists eight condi-
tions, any of which, if satisfied, may indicate that the child is in need of compul-
sory measures of care. 175 In general, a child who is beyond parental control, 
truant, suffering from parental neglect, or who has allegedly committed an 
offense, satisfies the conditions set forth in the ACt. 176 
After receiving an initial referral and conducting a preliminary investigation, 
the reporter then assesses the merits of the case to determine whether the child is 
in need of compulsory measures of care under the Act. 177 If insufficient evidence 
exists to support the referral, the reporter must dismiss the case. 178 If, however, 
the evidence in the case satisfies at least one of the preconditions set by the Act, 
the reporter will then consider the need for care. 179 
167. See supra note 111. 
168. Although the Scottish social work department was an integral part of the Kilbrandon Commit-
tee's reform recommendations and the Act, a thorough discussion of its reorganization and operation is 
beyond the scope of this Comment. For a discussion of the social work department, see Martin, The 
Social Work Department in CHILDREN'S HEARINGS 67-75 (F.M. Martin & K. Murray eds. 1982). See also 
Smith, Little Kiddies and Criminal Acts: The Role of Social Work in the Children's Hearings, 7 BRIT. J. Soc. 
WORK 4 (1977). 
169. Murray, supra note 22, at 16. 
170. See Act, supra note 18, § 39(4); Children's Hearings (Scotland) Rules, supra note 20, rule 6(1). 
For a discussion of the contents and use of the social background reports, see Hiddleston, The Role of the 
Hearing: Using Reports in THE SCOTTISH JUVENILE JUSTICE SYSTEM 32-47 (F.M. Martin & K. Murray eds. 
1982). 
171. Murray, supra note 22, at 21. 
172. Grant, supra note 7, at 28. 
173. Murray, supra note 22, at 16. 
174. Act, supra note 18, § 37(1). 
175. Act, supra note 18, § 32 (quoted supra note 129). 
176. See KILBRANDON REPORT, supra note 6, ~ 5. 
177. Finlayson, supra note 24, at 49. 
178. Kelly, supra note 133, at 261. 
179. See id. at 261-62. 
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In considering the need for care, a reporter has wide discretion as to whether 
treatment should be administered, whether it should be voluntary or mandatory, 
and what form it should take. 180 Some referrals may require no more than a 
family conference with the reporter to remedy the situation. 181 In other situa-
tions, the reporter may ask the family to accept voluntary treatment from the 
social work department, usually in the form of advice, guidance, or assistance. 182 
If the reporter chooses either of these alternatives, thereby alleviating the condi-
tions suggesting a need for care, the child will not appear before a children's 
hearing. 183 
Generally, the reporter looks beyond the immediate circumstances of the 
referral to determine the child's needs within the context of the child's social 
background. 184 If the reporter believes that the circumstances of the referral are 
serious enough to require that the child receive compulsory measures of care, 
the reporter must refer the child to a children's hearing. 185 
A children's hearing is comprised of three members of the children's panel for 
the local authority. 186 The hearing must include at least one male and one female 
member; one of the three is designated to chair the panel. 187 The reporter and 
the social worker assigned to the case are also present. 188 
Prior to the hearing date, the three hearing members receive and review 
information containing the child's social background report, the grounds for 
referral, and the reporter's statement of the reasons that the case is before the 
panel.189 When the parents l90 and the child l91 appear before the hearing, the 
chair must begin by explaining the grounds of referral as stated by the repor-
ter. 192 Both parents and child must then decide whether they accept in whole or 
180. Finlayson, supra note 24, at 49. 
181. Sinclair, Entering the System in THE SCO"ITISH JUVENILE JUSTICE SYSTEM 24, 26 (F.M. Martin & K. 
Murrayeds. 1982). 
182. Finlayson, supra note 24, at 49; Kelly, supra note 133, at 261. 
183. Finlayson, supra note 24, at 49. 
184. Kelly, supra note 133, at 261-62; Sinclair, supra note 181, at 26-27. 
185. Finlayson, supra note 24, at 49. 
186. Act, supra note 18, § 34(1), (2). 
187. [d. § 34(2). 
188. Murray, supra note 22, at 15 n .•. 
189. Children's Hearings (Scotland) Rules, supra note 20, rule 6. 
The relevant reports and the course of the proceedings depend on the type of hearing convened. 
This Comment describes the procedure for a hearing on an initial referral. For a description of other 
types of hearings, see Murray, supra note 22, at 19-21. 
190. Parents have both a right and a duty to attend all stages of the hearing, unless the hearing 
determines that the requirement of attendance is either unreasonable or unnecessary. Parents who fail 
to attend are subject to a fine. Act, supra note 18, § 41. 
191. After receiving proper notice, a child is obligated to attend the hearing unless the hearing is 
satisfied that the child's attendance is unnecessary or would be detrimental to the child's interests. Act, 
supra note 18, § 40(1),(2). 
192. Act, supra note 18, § 42(1). 
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In part the grounds of referral, as put forth by the reporter, as an accurate 
description of the situation. 193 
If the child and the parents accept the grounds of referral as true, the hearing 
may then discuss the merits of the case. 194 The hearing considers all relevant 
reports, and, through discussion with the family, discovers the feelings and 
opinions of the parents and child. 195 Most frequently the hearing participants, 
including the parents and child, sit around a table in order to facilitate conversa-
tion. 196 Hearing members, through their words and demeanor, try to assure the 
child from the outset that the system is interested in helping the child and that 
the hearing is interested in listening to the family's views. 197 Once the family 
gains confidence in the system, discussion and cooperation more readily fol-
low. 198 
If the child or parents do not accept the grounds of referral and the hearing 
wishes to pursue further the merits of the case, 199 the chair directs the reporter to 
refer the case to the Sheriff Court200 for a finding of fact to establish the grounds 
of referral. 201 Once satisfied that the evidence supports a ground of referral, the 
shrriff remits the case to the hearing for discussion and consideration of proper 
tre~tment.202 If a family accepts only a portion of the grounds of referral, the 
hearing may choose whether to proceed with respect to the grounds not in 
dispute or to refer the case to the sheriff for a fact-finding on the disputed 
grounds.203 With either procedure, the hearing may not discuss any portion of 
the case for which the grounds have not been established.204 
After the facts have been established, and after the hearing members, repor-
ter, social worker, parents, and child have thoroughly discussed the case, the 
three hearing members are responsible for recommending treatment.205 If the 
hearing decides that the child needs no further treatment, it may dismiss the 
case. 206 If the hearing concludes that the child is in need of compulsory measures 
193. See id. 
194. Id. at § 42(2)(a). 
195. Fox, supra note 4, at 87-88; Kelly, supra note 133, at 262-63. 
196. Fox, supra note 4, at 80-81; CHILDREN OUT OF COURT, supra note I, at 95. 
197. See Fox, supra note 4, at 68-69, 82-83, 87-88. 
198. See KILBRANDON REPORT, supra note 6, ~ 109. 
199. At this point, the hearing has the option of discharging the referral without further discussion. 
Act, supra note 18, § 42 (2)(c); see infra note 231. 
200. See supra note 4. 
201. Act, supra note 18, § 42(2)(c). 
202. Act, supra note 18, § 42(6). The sheriff weighs the evidence to decide whether it supports the 
grounds of referral. If the child is accused of an offense, the sheriff uses the "beyond a reasonable 
doubt" standard in weighing the evidence. In a care or protection referral, the sheriff uses the "balance 
of probabilities" standard of proof for the referral. Finlayson, supra note 24, at 48-49. 
203. Act, supra note 18, § 42(2)(b), (c). 
204. Fox, supra note 4, at 72; Grant, supra note 7, at 28. 
205. Act, supra note 18, § 43(1). 
206. Id. § 43(2). 
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of care, it issues a supervlSlon requirement.207 The supervIsion requirement 
either allows the child to remain at home under the mandatory supervision of 
the social work department, or requires the child to attend a residential institu-
tion, such as a List D school208 or a children's home.209 After implementing a 
supervision requirement, the hearing must monitor and periodically review the 
case.210 No supervision requirement may be imposed longer than one year 
without review by the hearing.2I1 
Upon review of the case, the hearing may extend or vary the requirement for 
another year, and the process may continue until the child's eighteenth birth-
day.212 A supervision requirement that has not been reviewed within one year 
automatically lapses.213 Additionally, no child over eighteen years old may be 
subjected to supervision orders by a children's hearing.214 
In addition to the hearing's mandatory reviews, the family has a right after 
three months to request a review of the original order for adjustment of a 
supervision requirement. 215 After six months, the family may also request a 
review of a renewal of the identical terms of the original requirement.216 This 
provision allows the hearing to adjust the supervision requirement to meet a 
child's changing circumstances, both when the child has shown improvement 
and when the treatment recommended has not been effective.217 To review a 
requirement, the parents, child, reporter, and social worker again come before 
the hearing to discuss the current circumstances of the case.218 The decision to 
alter the supervision requirement remains in the hands of the three hearing 
members.219 
In addition to their right to request review of supervision, the parents and 
child have the right to appeal any final decision.220 The reporter assumes the 
duty of providing the sheriff with all reports and statements concerning the 
case.221 In the event of dissatisfaction with the sheriff's decision, the family has a 
207. Id. § 44(1). 
208. List D schools are specialized residential schools for young delinquents. Formally known as 
"approved schools," they derive their present name from the list on which they appear in the Scottish 
Education Department's index. CHILDREN OUT OF COURT, supra note 1, at 31 n.4. 
209. Kelly, supra note 133, at 264. The social work department is responsible for the maintenance of 
the children's homes. Murray, supra note 22, at 16. 
210. Act, supra note 18, § 48. 
211. Id. § 48(3). 
212. Id. §§ 47(2), 48(3). 
213. Id. § 48(3). 
214. [d. § 47(2). 
215. [d. § 48(4). 
216. Id. 
217. Set KILBRANDON REPORT, supra note 6, ~ 91. 
218. Set Children's Hearings (Scotland) Rules, supra note 20, rule 17. 
219. See id., rule 17(4). 
220. Act, supra note 18, § 49(1). 
221. [d. § 49(2). 
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further right of appeal to the Court of Session.222 This appeal is limited, how-
ever, to points of law and questions of procedure.223 
In sum, the Children's Hearings System separates the fact-finding forum from 
the treatment forum; the duty to make all necessary fact-finding decisions rests 
with the courts, while treatment decisions are the responsibility of the reporter 
and the hearing. The family has the opportunity to discuss the situation with the 
reporter and hearing members, although the family has no actual voice in the 
hearing's decision making process. The family does have the right to appeal to 
the courts any final hearing decision that they consider unjust. 
V. COURT DECISIONS 
After the Children's Hearings System became effective on April 15, 1971, it 
was hampered by procedural difficulties caused by omissions and ambiguities in 
the statutes governing the system.224 Proponents of the system hoped that rou-
tine practice within the system itself would remedy most ambiguities and that 
those practices that were challenged in court would be clarified by judicial 
opinion. 225 They recognized that the courts have the power to rule on interim 
issues of fact-finding and to review final orders of the panels.226 By establishing 
precedents through judicial review, the courts could establish a uniform practice 
throughout the hearings system.227 
A. H. v. McGregor 
One of the first opinions handed down from the judiciary on the subject of 
children's hearings concerned the appealability of panel decisions to the courts. 
In H. v. McGregor,228 a child who allegedly assaulted another child was referred 
to a hearing. 229 When the child refused to accept the grounds of referral, the 
chair of the hearing directed the reporter to apply to the sheriff for a fact-
finding. 230 The parents objected to the chair's directive, contending that the 
panel should dismiss the referral. 231 The hearing, however, could not discuss the 
222. See supra note 4. 
223. Act, supra note 18, § 50. 
224. Grant, Bridging Gaps: Three Cases on Children's Hearings, 1973 S.L.T. (News) 190 [hereinafter 
cited as Bridging Gaps]. 
225. [d. 
226. Act, supra note 18, §§ 42(2)(c), 49. 
227. See Bridging Gaps, supra note 224, at 190. 
228. 1973 S.L.T. 11 O. 
229. [d. at 113. 
230. [d. 
231. [d. at 114. A significant distinction exists between a discharge as an alternative to requesting a 
fact-finding from the sheriff and a discharge after a full evaluation of the case. The panel generally 
recommends the first type of discharge only if it decides that further treatment would be unnecessary, 
even if the grounds of referral were established. The panel recommends the second type of discharge 
396 BOSTON COLLEGE INTERNATIONAL & COMPARATIVE LAW REVIEW [Vol. VIII, No.2 
merits of the case until the grounds of referral were established.232 The parents 
appealed the hearing's direction for a fact-finding, basing their right of appeal 
on section 49(1) of the Act. 233 Both the sheriff and the Court of Session agreed 
that a decision to obtain a fact-finding from the courts is not a decision on the 
disposal of the referral, and section 49(1) of the Act refers only to decisions 
disposing of the referral. 234 Section 42(2)(c) grants the hearing discretion to 
discharge the referral when the grounds are not accepted,235 but should the 
hearing decide not to exercise this discretion, it must refer the case to the sheriff 
before the case can proceed. 236 A decision not to discharge the referral is, at best, 
a procedural decision, and the intention of the drafters of the Act was not to 
permit the delays accompanying appeals on points of procedure.237 Thus, the 
Court of Session concluded that the family has no right to appeal a hearing's 
directive to the reporter to establish disputed facts before the sheriff. The 
hearing has the right to request that the sheriff hear contested facts. 
B. Kennedy v. B. and Another 
Within the same year that the Court of Session decided H. v. McGregor, it 
decided a second case involving contested facts before the sheriff. In Kennedy v. 
B. and Another,23M the Court of Session considered whether a hearing retains 
jurisdiction when the circumstances of the case change significantly before the 
sheriff establishes the grounds of referral. 239 In Kennedy, an eight year old child 
was referred to a children's panel as in need of compulsory measures of care 
under section 32(2)(c) of the Act.240 The grounds of referral was that lack of 
parental care would likely cause him unnecessary suffering or seriously impair 
his health or development. 241 According to the facts of the referral, the boy lived 
in Glasgow with his mother and seven siblings in a one-room house that lacked 
basic amenities and a sufficient supply ofbedding.242 When the local authorities 
only if it decides, after completely and carefully evaluating all information available, that further 
treatment orders are not necessary. Bridging Gaps, supra note 224, at 192. 
232. H. v. McGregor, 1973 S.L.T. at 112; see Act, supra note IS, § 42(2)(c). 
233. H. v. McGregor, 1973 S.L.T. at 112. Section 49(1) provides: 
A child, or his parents, or both, may, within a period of three weeks beginning with the date of any 
decision of the children's hearing, appeal to the sheriff in chambers against that decision and the child 
or his parents shall be heard by the sheriff as to the reasons for the appeal. 
Act, supra note IS, § 49(1). 
234. H. v. McGregor, 1973 S.L.T. at 114-15. 
235. Act, supra note IS, § 42(2)(c); see supra note 231. 
236. H. v. McGregor, 1973 S.L.T. at 114-15. 
237. !d. at 116. 
23S. 1973 S.L.T. 3S. 
239. Id. at 39. 
240. See supra note 129 (text of section 32 of the Act). 
241. Kennedy, 1973 S.L.T. at 3S. 
242. Id. at 39. 
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eventually took the children into care, the children's skin and hair were vermin-
ous, and their clothing was so filthy that it had to be destroyed.243 
The child was taken into care on August 9, 1971, and brought before a 
hearing on August 16, 1971, where he and his mother refused to accept the 
grounds of referral. 244 The hearing directed the referral to the sheriff, who 
heard evidence on September 13, 1971, including a statement from the child's 
mother that circumstances had substantially improved since August 9 because 
the child was now living with his grandparents, and, therefore, the grounds as 
stated by the reporter no longer existed. 245 The sheriff agreed that the grounds 
were not established and dismissed the application.246 The reporter appealed, 
focussing the appeal on whether the sheriff's decision should be based on the 
situation at the time of the original referral or the time that the case was brought 
into court.247 
The Court of Session concluded that the sheriff should base the decision on 
the circumstances existing at the time that the sheriff hears the evidence. 24H The 
Court looked to the present tense wording of the Act,249 which provides that the 
sheriff has the duty to decide whether the grounds of referral are established and 
whether the lack of care is likely to be detrimental to the child.250 Thus, the 
sheriff is obliged to consider pertinent facts or events occurring since the time of 
the original referral to the panel in determining whether the grounds of referral 
are still valid. 251 
The holding in Kennedy, which also applies to children beyond the control of 
their parents,252 compels the reporter to continue investigating the circumstances 
of the referral up to the date of proof for referrals under section 32(a), (b), or (c) 
of the Act.253 Although the holding may not impose upon the reporter a specific 
duty to investigate, as a practical matter a reporter who fails to continue the 
investigation may find the referral challenged by evidence of improved circum-
stances.254 If the reporter is unprepared to rebut such evidence, the sheriff will 
most likely adjourn the case and order the reporter to continue the investigation 
in light of the changed circumstances.255 If the reporter cannot discover new 
evidence to support the referral, the holding in Kennedy allows the sheriff to 
243. /d. 
244. [d. at 40. 
245. /d. at 39-40. 
246. [d. at 40. 
247. [d. 
248. [d. at 41. 
249. Act, supra note 18, § 42(2)(c). 
250. Klmnedy, 1973 S.L.T. at 41. 
251. [d. at 40-41. 
252. [d. 
253. See supra note 129 (text of section 32 of the Act). Bridging Gaps, supra note 224, at 191. 
254. See id. at 191. 
255. Klmnedy, 1973 S.L.T. at 41. 
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dismiss the referral. Thus, not only may the hearing request that the sheriff 
review evidence of disputed facts, but the sheriff must also review evidence 
gathered after the hearing has requested the fact-finding. 
C. McGregor v. D. 
In 1977 the Court of Session decided another children's hearing case concern-
ing a ruling on evidence before the Sheriff Court. In McGregor v. D.256 a child 
previously charged with breaking into a neighbor's home was referred to a 
children's hearing because he allegedly attempted to interfere with the adminis-
tration of justice. 257 The facts of the referral stated that the child returned to the 
neighbor's home and, knowing that the owner might testify at his trial, threat-
ened her with physical injury if she were to appear in court.258 At the hearing, 
the child and his father refused to accept the grounds of referral, and the chair 
directed the reporter to apply to the sheriff for a fact-finding. 259 
The solicitor for the family260 challenged the relevancy of the grounds of 
referral, arguing before the sheriff that the facts as set forth, even if proved, did 
not constitute the offense mentioned in the referral. 261 The reporter conceded 
this argument but requested that the sheriff hear the evidence of the case and 
find that the child had committed an offense, albeit a different offense than the 
one named in the referral. 262 The reporter asked in the alternative for leave to 
amend the grounds of referral in order to substitute the name of the offense 
which the facts would support.263 The sheriff dismissed the application as ir-
relevant, denied leave to amend, and discharged the referral. 264 The case pre-
sented three issues to the Court of Session on appeal: first, whether the sheriff 
has the power to dismiss the application as irrelevant; second, whether the 
sheriff was correct in dismissing the application as irrelevant; and third, whether 
a reporter should have leave to amend a referral. 265 
In considering the questions on appeal, the Court of Session emphasized that 
the nature of the proceedings under Part III of the Act are not criminal 
proceedings; rather, they are civil proceedings sui generis 266 to which the ordinary 
256. 1977 S.L.T. 182. 
257. Id. at 182, 184. 
258. Id. 
259. Id. at 184. 
260. The Act recognizes the family's need for legal representation in proceedings before the sheriff. 
Act, supra note 18, § 42( 4). The Act further provides for legal aid to those families who qualify. Id. § 53. 
261. McGregor v. D., 1977 S.L.T. at 184. 
262. Id. 
263. Id. 
264. Id. 
265. Id. 
266. Civil proceedings sui generis are proceedings of their own kind or class. BLACK'S LAW DICTIO-
NARY 1286 (5th ed. 1979). 
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codes of civil and criminal procedure do not apply.267 In fact, the Sheriff Court 
Procedure Rules 2fiH expressly exclude the ordinary code of civil procedure from 
the sheriff court proceedings.26!l Since the ordinary codes are inapplicable, the 
Court of Session looked to the Act itself, and to the subsequent statutory proce-
dures pertaining specifically to the Children's Hearings System as the sole 
sources of procedural authority.270 
The Sheriff Court Procedure Rules 271 list no specific provision allowing for 
dismissal of applications before hearing the evidence.272 To the contrary, the 
rules explicitly state that "the sheriff shall ... hear the evidence tendered by or 
on behalf of the reporter."273 Moreover, section 42 of the Act274 refers to a 
finding upon evidence presented to the court and requires a ruling on questions 
of fact before a decision can be reached as to whether the child has committed an 
offense.275 Basing its reasoning on the wording of the Sheriff Court Procedure 
Rules and on section 42 of the Act, the Court of Session held that a sheriff has 
the obligation to hear the reporter's evidence.276 Therefore, the sheriff in 
McGregor v. D. was not entitled to dismiss the referral before the evidence was 
presented. 277 
Thus, not only is the hearing entitled to request a fact-finding, but the sheriff 
must hear the evidence that the reporter presents, even if the reporter has failed 
to name an offense relevant to the evidence. Under this rule, if a child is referred 
to a hearing on irrelevant grounds,27H and the family, usually legally unadvised 
and unfamiliar with the concept of relevancy, accepts those grounds, the hearing 
may proceed to a disposal. 27!l If the child or parent denies the grounds and sends 
the case to the sheriff for fact-finding, the sheriff is obligated to hear the 
evidence, despite the irrelevant grounds. 2Ho 
Although a second opinion, written by Lord Emslie, acknowledged that these 
proceedings were a waste of time in situations that constitute no recognized 
267. McGregor v. D., 1977 S.L.T. at 185. See aLIO McGregor v. T., 1975 S.L.T. 76; Kennedy v. 0., 
1975 S.L.T. 235 (Court of Session declared proceedings under Part III of the Act to be civil proceedings 
sui Reneris). 
268. Sheriff Court Procedure Rules, supra note 23, sched. 2, pt. I. 
269. McGregor v. D., 1977 S.L.T. al 185. 
270 [d. 
271. See supra note 23. 
272. McGregor v. D., 1977 S.L.T. at 186. 
273. Sheriff Court Procedure Rules, supra note 22, rule 8(1). 
274. Act, supra note 18, § 42(2)(c), (5), (6). 
275. McGregor v. D., 1977 S.L.T. at 185-86, 187-88. 
276. [d. at 186, 187. 
277. [d. 
278. A referral on irrelevant grounds will probably result from a reporter's unintentionally poor 
drafting of the referral document. Grant, More Bridge-Building, 1978 S.L. T. (News) 30 I, 302 [hereinaf~ 
ter cited as More BridRe-Building]. 
279. Id. 
280. [d. 
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offense at law,281 cases brought on irrelevant grounds of referral will not always 
be dismissed after hearings on the evidence. 282 Rule 10 of the Sheriff Court 
Procedural Rules283 allows the sheriff to find that the child has committed any 
offense supported by the evidence; the offense need not have been specified in 
the grounds of referral. 284 Therefore, after the reporter has presented evidence 
and the sheriff has established the facts of the referral, the sheriff may then 
proceed to determine whether the facts support any offense at all, regardless of 
the offense that the reporter previously named in the referral and communi-
cated to the family. 285 If the facts do not disclose an offense, then the sheriff may 
reasonably discharge the referral. 286 If the sheriff errs in the decision to dis-
charge, the parties may appeal the decision under section 50 of the Act. 287 
In regard to the third issue of the case, the reporter took the appeal with the 
hope that the Court of Session would give a definitive ruling on the competence 
of amendment or addition of grounds. 21l1l The Act, the Children's Hearing 
(Scotland) Rules, and the Sheriff Court Procedure Rules are all silent on the 
subject. 2H9 The opinions of both judges, relying heavily upon the lack of express 
power in the procedural acts, concluded that the reporter may not amend the 
grounds of referral before the sheriff.290 Furthermore, a material amendment 
before the sheriff could radically alter the grounds of referral on which the 
hearing authorized the reporter to proceed. 291 Neither opinion made clear 
281. McGregor v. D., 1977 S.L.T. at 186. 
282. See More Bridge-Building, supra note 278, at 302. 
283. Rule 10 of the Sheriff Court Procedure Rules provides: "Where the grounds of referral are 
alleged to constitute an offence or offences or any attempt thereat the sheriff may find on the facts that 
any offence established by the facts has been committed." Sheriff Court Procedure Rules,supra note 22, 
rule 10. 
284. More Bridge-Building, supra note 278, at 302. 
285. ld. Although the holding of McGregor v. D. was phrased in broad terms, the facts pertained to 
an offense committed by the child. In McGregor v. A., 1982 S.L. T. 45,47, the Court of Session held that 
rule 10 of the Sheriff Court Procedure Rules and the holding in McGregor v. D. were equally applicable 
to offenses committed by another against the child. 
286. McGregor v. D., 1977 S.L.T. at 186. 
287. ld. 
288. More Bridge-Building, supra note 278, at 303. 
289. ld. 
290. /d. 
Amendment is a familiar creature of the rules of procedure for criminal and civil business and 
it finds no place, either expressly or by implication, in the procedure designed to regulate the 
operation of [application of fact-finding to the'Sheriff]. 
McGregor v. D., 1977 S.L.T. at 186 (opinion of Lord President) . 
. . . [Tlhere are no provisions in the statutory code for the application or use of any of the 
familiar steps of civil process in the sheriff court. There are no answers to the statement to the 
ground of referral and therefore no adjustment of pleadings. There is consequently no closed 
record which can suffer "amendment" nor are there any operative conclusions which could be 
amended. 
[d. at 187 (opinion of Lord Cameron). 
291. [d. at 189. 
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whether amendment of the referral was permissible at any time prior to appear-
ance before the sheriff. 292 
In sum, the decision in McGregor v. D. held that a sheriff may not dismiss a 
referral as irrelevant, and that a reporter has no power to amend a referral 
before the sheriff. The decision instead recognized the power set forth in Rule 
10 of the Sheriff Court Procedure Rules that allows a sheriff to find that any 
offense supporting the facts of the case upholds the referral. 
D. J.F. and Others v. McGregor 
The Court of Session extended the rulings in Kennedy and McGregor v. D., 
which required the sheriff to hear the evidence presented by the reporter, to the 
case ofJ.F. and Others v. McGregor. 293 Four children were referred to a hearing 
under section 32(2)(d) of the Act because another sibling had been assaulted in 
the family household. 294 The children were too young to accept the grounds of 
referral, but at a hearing before the sheriff, the parents took the advice of a 
solicitor and accepted the grounds in order to minimize the expense of trial. 295 
The sheriff held the grounds to be established based solely on the parents' 
acceptance and remitted the case to a children's hearing to proceed with treat-
ment. 296 Appeal from the order was taken to the Court of Session.297 
The Court of Session noted that neither the Act nor the subsequent pro-
cedural rules provided guidelines for accepting grounds of referral before the 
sheriff, but it emphasized that the procedure explicitly required the sheriff to 
hear evidence before deciding that the grounds had been established.298 Section 
42(7) of the Act299 requires the sheriff to find the grounds of referral when a 
child is incapable of understanding the explanation of the referral. 300 The sheriff 
292. See More Bridge-Building, supra note 278, at 303. 
293. 1981 S.L.T. 334. 
294. IF. and Others, 1981 S.L.T. at 334. 
295. Id. at 335. 
296. [d. 
297. Id. at 334. 
298. Id. at 335. 
299. Section 42(7) of the Act, as in effect when this case was decided, provides: 
Where a children's hearing are satisfied that the child for any reason is not capable of 
understanding the explanation of the grounds of referral required by subsection (I) of this 
section, or in the course of, or at the conclusion of that explanation, it appears not to be 
understood by the child, the hearing shall, unless they decide to discharge the referral, direct 
the reporter to make application to the sheriff for a finding as to whether any of the grounds 
for the referral have been established, and the provisions of this section relating to an 
application to the sheriff under subsection (2)(c) thereof shall apply as they apply to an 
application under that subsection. 
Act, supra note 18, § 42(7). Cf note 374 infra and accompanying text (text of Section 42(7) with 1983 
amendments and a discussion of reasons for the amendment). 
300. IF. and Others, 1981 S.L.T. at 335. 
402 BOSTON COLLEGE INTERNATIONAL & COMPARATIVE LAW REVIEW [Vol. VIII, No.2 
is to proceed with the findings as specified under section 42(6)301 by examining 
the evidence before the court.302 The Court of Session interpreted the word 
"evidence" in section 42(6) to mean evidence in its ordinary legal use, and 
referred to Rule 8(1) of the Sheriff Court Procedure Rules, which mandates the 
sheriff to hear evidence before ruling on disputed grounds of referral. 303 By 
definition under Rule 2(3) of the Sheriff Court Procedure Rules,304 the facts in 
J.F. and Others were in dispute because the children were not capable of consent-
ing to them.30s 
The Court concluded that the the procedure for accepting the grounds of 
referral at hearings of section 42 applications should not be altered simply 
because ofthe absence of guidelines or provisions dealing with the acceptance. 306 
Thus, the Court remanded the case to the sheriff for a finding of fact. 307 The 
decision in J.F. and Others v. McGregor, considered in conjunction with the 
holding in McGregor v. D., effectively prohibits a sheriff from determining the 
grounds of a referral under section 42(2)(c) and section 42(7) of the Act without 
first hearing the evidence. 30s 
The four cases discussed above illustrate the Court of Session's attempt to 
establish a uniform procedure for fact-finding before the sheriff. In H. v. 
McGregor, the Court recognized the hearing's right to request a fact-finding 
when the case involves disputed facts. Next, in Kennedy v. B. and Another, the 
Court held that the sheriff must make the finding of fact in light of the child's 
present circumstances. In McGregor v. D., the Court stated that although a 
reporter may not amend the grounds of referral before the sheriff, the sheriff is 
permitted to find that an offense not mentioned in the referral has been estab-
lished by the facts of the case. Finally, inJ.F. and Others v. McGregor, the Court 
required the sheriff to hear all of the evidence in cases where a child is incapable 
of understanding the explanation of the referral. 
301. Section 42(6) of the Act, as in effect when this case was decided, provides: 
Where the sheriff is satisfied on the evidence before him that any of the grounds in respect {)f 
which the application has been made has been established he shall remit the case to the 
reporter to make arrangements for a children's hearing for consideration and determination 
of the case, and where a ground for the referral of the case is the condition referred to in 
section 32(2)(g) of this Act, the sheriff in hearing the application shall apply to the evidence 
relating to that ground the standard of proof required in criminal procedure. 
Act, supra note 18, § 42(6). Cf note 373 infra and accompanying text (text of Section 42(6) with 1983 
amendments and a discussion of reasons for the amendments). 
302. IF. and Others, 1981 S.L.T. at 335. 
303. !d. 
304. Rule 2(3) of the Sheriff Court Procedure Rules provides: 
In these Rules any reference, however expressed, to disputed grounds of referral shall be 
construed as a reference to grounds of referral which form the subject of an application under 
subsection (2)(c) or subsection (7) of section 42 of the Act. 
Sheriff Court Procedure Rules, supra note 23, rule 2(3). 
305. IF. and Others, 1981 S.L.T. 334. 
306. See id. at 335. 
307. !d. at 335-36. 
308. Forshaw, supra note 34, at 194. 
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VI. ANALYSIS 
A. Effects of the Court Decisions 
In instituting uniform procedures In the Children's Hearings System, the 
Court of Session frequently looked to the wording of the Act and the principles 
of the Kilbrandon Report to support its decisions. The results of those decisions, 
however, were not always in harmony with the original intent of the Kilbrandon 
Committee. Some of the Court of Session's opinions fostered the principles of 
preventive treatment supported by the Committee; other rulings of the Court 
merely frustrated the principles upon which the Committee founded the hear-
ings system. 
While H. v. McGregor held that the family has no right to appeal a hearing's 
request for a fact-finding because the request is not a final dispositional order, 
the decision nevertheless recognizes the rights of both child and parents to 
appeal from a final order of the hearing.309 As provided in the Court's opinion, 
the right of appeal remains even if the hearing decides to dismiss the referral. 31o 
In practice, few appeals will be made from discharges because a party would act 
illogically to deny the grounds of referral in front of the hearing and then insist 
that the sheriff review the facts once the hearing had granted a discharge.3l1 
In a few situations, however, the right of appeal from a discharge may provide 
an important protection for either abused children or parents unable to control a 
child.312 For example, if the hearing's ultimate decision in a care and protection 
referral is to discharge the case, the child may wish to appeal to the sheriff for 
protection, perhaps from physically abusive parents.313 Likewise, parents unable 
to control a child may believe that a discharge is contrary to the child's best 
interests, and will appeal to the sheriff for mandatory social services. 314 If the 
sheriff allows the' appeal and finds that the hearing's decision was not justified in 
all circumstances, the sheriff must remit the case to the hearing for reconsidera-
tion. 31 " 
Thus, an appeal from a discharge allows the appealing party to take an 
additional step to prevent further injury to the child or future delinquency in 
cases where either the child or the parents feel that the hearing's disposal was 
imprudent.316 The recognition of the right to appeal a discharge by the sheriff 
courts provides an additional procedural safeguard to insure that the decision of 
the hearing is in the child's best interest.317 This decision is consistent with the 
309. H. v. McGregor, 1973 S.L.T. at 114-16. 
310. See id. at 114, 116. 
311. Bridging Gaps, supra note 224, at 92. 
312. /d. 
313. /d. 
314. [d. 
315. /d. (citing Act, supra note 18, § 49(5)(b)). 
316. See Bridging Gaps, supra note 224, at 92. 
317. See id. 
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prevention principles espoused by the Kilbrandon Report. 318 By recognizing this 
additional procedural safeguard, the Court of Session has encouraged the pre-
vention of a child's harm or delinquency through a functional hearings system. 
The decision in Kennedy v. B. and Another,319 like the H. v. McGregor decision, 
protects children in need of care or protection and children beyond the control 
of their parents. The holding requires a sheriff considering the grounds of 
referral to hear any evidence collected subsequent to the initial referral that is 
presented to the court.320 The reporter must continue to monitor the child's 
situation to determine the facts of the case while the case is before the sheriff.321 
Reporters particularly need to monitor cases that fall under section 32(2)(b) 
and (c) of the Act because these cases involve harm or potential harm to a 
child.322 Both provisions of the Act are concerned with the child's future welfare, 
and evidence of changing circumstances may strongly affect the sheriff's assess-
ment of the child's situation and risk of future harm.323 Similarly, a child beyond 
the control of parents under section 32(2)(a) at the time of referral, but back 
within their control by the time the case is before the sheriff, may show by 
evidence of current circumstances that the conditions that precipitated the 
referral no longer exist and, therefore, that the child's welfare is no longer in 
jeopardy.324 By compelling the reporter to gather the most recent facts, the 
holding in Kennedy ensures that the sheriff's decision takes into account the 
child's present circumstances and considers the child's welfare in light Of those 
circumstances. 
While Kennedy ensures that referrals are disposed of in the child's best interests 
by ensuring that the sheriff considers the most recent circumstances relevant to 
the grounds of referral,325 the case also compels a second, and perhaps less 
desirable, conclusion.326 The Kennedy decision in effect gives the sheriff an 
opportunity to decide the final disposition of a case. 321 If a case before the sheriff 
contains facts that would support a referral, but the family brings to the sheriff's 
attention evidence of changed circumstances, the sheriff has the opportunity to 
decide whether, in light of the new facts revealed, the child needs social care or 
assistance.328 Although the Kennedy decision may seem reasonable in terms of its 
statutory interpretation,329 it nonetheless undercuts the Kilbrandon Committee's 
31S. See KILBRANDON REPORT, supra note 6, ~ 54. 
319. 1973 S.L.T. 3S. 
320. Kennedy, 1973 S.L.T. at 40-41. 
321. Bridging Gaps, supra note 224, at 191; see also Kennedy, 1973 S.L.T. at 40-41. 
322. Bridging Gaps, supra note 224, at 190. 
323. Id. 
324. Bridging Gaps, supra note 224, at 191. 
325. See Kennedy, 1973 S.L.T. at 40-41. 
326. Bridging Gaps, supra note 224, at 191. 
327. /d. 
32S. Id. 
329. Id.; see Act, supra note IS, § 42(5). 
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primary goal of separating the fact-finding forum from the treatment forum.33o 
By allowing the sheriff to consider new evidence in determining whether to 
dismiss a case, the Court of Session has opened the door to deciding questions of 
a child's welfare and treatment in the forum reserved for fact-finding.331 In the 
hypothetical extreme, a sheriff may dismiss a case brought before the court on 
disputed grounds based on a finding that the family's circumstances had im-
proved.332 Ifthe improvement were only temporary, however, the referral could 
be brought again in front of a children's hearing.333 The family could then 
dispute the facts again and ask that the case be presented to the sheriff. 334 If the 
family once again showed that its circumstances had improved, even iftemporar-
ily, the sheriff again would have the discretion to dismiss the referral free of all 
treatment measures.335 In this way, the family could successfully, and perhaps 
continuously, avoid compulsory treatment.336 Thus, the Kennedy decision may 
allow for disposal of a case without consideration of future care and treatment of 
the child.337 Also, it may allow for a parent to present to the court a superficial 
remedy, which may neither bind a party to its terms nor truly rectify the 
situation, in order to escape the hearing's jurisdiction.33~ 
In McGregor v. D.,339 the Court of Session reiterated its decision in Kennedy to 
recognize a sheriff's power to dismiss a referral.34o Concerning the other issues 
raised in the case, the Court employed two different canons of interpretation in 
justifying its holdings.341 
In examining the reporter's duty to specify the nature of the offense in the 
grounds of referral,342 the Court dismissed such a duty as irrelevant to the 
objective of the Act.343 In the proceedings below, the sheriff reasoned that the 
provisions of Rule 15(4) of the Children's Hearing (Scotland) Rules344 imply that 
the sheriff has a power to dismiss referrals that do not specify the nature of the 
330. See Bridging Gaps, supra note 224, at 191; KILBRANDON REPORT, supra note 6, ~~ 70, 73. 
331. Bridging Gaps, supra note 224, at 191. 
332. [d. 
333. [d. 
334. [d. 
335. See itt. 
336. See id. 
337. See id. 
338. See itt. 
339. 1977 S.L.T. 182. 
340. [d. at 185-86. 
341. More Bridge-Building, supra note 278, at 302. 
342. See Children's Hearings (Scotland) Rules, supra note 20, rule 14. 
343. See McGregor v. D., 1977 S.L.T. at 186, quoted in More Bridge-Building, supra note 278, at 302. 
344. Rule 15(4) provides: 
In the case of a condition mentioned in section 32(2)(g) of the Act, the statement of the facts 
constituting the offence shall have the same degree of specification as in a charge contained in 
a complaint under the Summary Jurisdiction (Scotland) Act 1954(a) and the statement shall 
also specify the nature of the offence in question. 
Children's Hearings (Scotland) Rules, supra note 20, rule 15(4). 
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offense in questions; otherwise, the provlSlon would be unenforceable and 
therefore meaningless.345 The Court of Session preferred a functional approach 
to the legislation; it reasoned that because reporters often lack legal training, a 
reporter should not be expected to know the correct labels for offenses.346 Since 
proceedings under Part III of the Act are civil proceedings sui generis, a reporter 
is not bound to high standards of specificity and accuracy in specifying criminal 
offenses.347 Rule 15(4) is subordinate and ancillary to section 42 ofthe Act;34H the 
rule would have little value if it functioned contrary to the best interests of the 
child and therefore against the overall objective of the statute.349 
In subordinating the importance of Rule 15 (4) to the overall objective of 
providing for the child's best interest, the Court of Session may have overlooked 
two important aspects of the rule .350 First, the drafters of the Children's Hearing 
(Scotland) Rules may have foreseen that reporters would not always be legally 
qualified and that families would not always have access to legal advice.3'! Under 
these circumstances the drafters may have intended that a reporter be held to a 
high standard of specification in the grounds of referral and may have con-
structed Rule 15(4) to convey that intent.352 
Second, the Court of Session apparently ignored the fact that the community 
has no right to interfere with a child's life unless one of the conditions under 
section 32(2) of the Act occurS. 353 The disposal of a children's hearing is some-
what akin to an action taken in criminal court insofar as the disposal may include 
the deprivation of liberty and may last for an extended period of time, until the 
child's eighteenth birthday.354 Since the family may not wish the child to be 
subject to compulsory treatment, the referral should be drafted to best protect 
the child according to high standards of judicial scrutiny.3;;;; To deny children 
these protections is to deny them rights which adults possess, which could make 
compulsory treatment seem "more punitive and arbitrary than a criminal sanc-
tion. "356 
Given the Kilbrandon Committee's concern that the hearings system should 
appear to administer justice,357 the Court of Session failed to consider that the 
de-emphasis of the offense itself may contradict the child's own sense of jus-
345. McGregor v. D., 1977 S.L.T. at 185. 
346. /d. at 186. 
347. [d. at 185. 
348. More Bridge-Building, supra note 278, at 302. 
349. McGregor v. D., 1977 S.L.T. at 186. 
350. More Bridge-Building, supra note 278, at 302. 
351. /d. 
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353. MOTe Bridge-Building, supra note 278, at 302. 
354. Id. 
355. Id. 
356. More Bridge-Building, supra note 278, at 302. 
357. Fox, supra note 4, at 68; if. KILBRANDON REPORT, supra note 6, ~ 57. 
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tice.358 In the vast majority of cases, the commission of the offense is both the 
formal and obvious grounds of referral, and the offense must remain at the 
center of the case for the system to make sense to the family.359 A child and 
parents confronted with discussion and questions concerning conditions in the 
home, the child's schooling, and the child-rearing process in general may be-
come confused and resentful if they see no link between the hearing's inquiries 
and the offense that precipitated the referral. 36o A family that sees no foundation 
for the treatment orders issued by the hearing is likely to regard such a system 
with bewilderment and suspicion rather than with trust. 36 ! 
In contrast to the functional approach taken by the Court of Session to 
downplay specific references to the offense itself, the Court in McGregor v. D. also 
took a literal approach. The Court used this literal approach in interpreting the 
duties of the sheriff to hear all of the evidence presented by the reporter and the 
power bestowed on the sheriff by Rule 10 of the Sheriff Court Procedure Rules 
to find that any offense supported by the evidence has been committed.362 This 
procedure could completely deprive a family of any notice of the offense until 
the sheriff pronounced the finding. 363 This lack of notice may easily engender 
the sense of confusion and unfair treatment that the Kilbrandon Committee 
wanted to avoid.3s4 
The holding in McGregor v. D. places at risk the public's trust in the Children's 
Hearings System's ability to administer justice. If a reporter carelessly drafts the 
referral statement, the family may have no actual notice of the offense until the 
sheriff pronounces the finding. The holding in this case prohibits the family 
from learning the true grounds of referral, and thereby prevents them from 
addressing the actual merits of the case. As a result, the parents and child may 
become unwilling, uncooperative participants in the treatment ultimately rec-
ommended by the hearing. According to the Kilbrandon Committee, lack of the 
family's cooperation would likely result in ineffective treatment. 
The requirement that the sheriff must hear all evidence presented by the 
reporter, as stated in McGregor v. D., may also work to protect the child from 
false fact-finding. 365J.F. and Others v. McGregor established another requirement, 
providing that a finding of fact occur when the child is silent, either because he 
or she has refused to answer or is too young to answer.366 This requirement 
guarantees that a case cannot reach disposal unless the child accepts the facts, or 
358. May, supra note 31. at 219. 
359. [d. 
360. Id. 
361. !d. 
362. See More Bridge-Building, supra note 278. at 301-302. 
363. !d. 
364. Id. at 302-303. 
365. Forshaw, supra note 34. at 194. 
366. 1982 S.L.T. at 335. 
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a separate authority, the sheriff, ensures on behalf of the child that the facts are 
true.367 In this way, the child is protected from parental assent when the parents' 
interests may differ from the child's interests.3GB 
Perhaps the only disadvantage of these protections afforded to children is that 
they may not extend far enough.369 The sheriff court acts as curator on behalf of 
the child only when the child is silent, but even in the most complex cases, the 
court may be excluded if the child accepts the grounds of referral. 370 The sheriff 
may not interfere with the child's decision, even if this decision is the result of the 
child's limited experience or intelligence, inadequate legal advice, or other fac-
tors which the child never articulates to either parents or hearing members.371 
B. The 1983 Amendments 
One unfortunate result of the Court of Session's insistence that the sheriff 
hear all ofthe evidence in disputed referrals was the expenditure of judicial time 
on proceedings where the grounds of referral truly were no longer in dispute.372 
After the decision inJ.F. and Others v. McGregor, sheriffs began to hear evidence 
not only in care or protection cases where the child was too young to understand 
the grounds of referral, but also in cases of teenage offenders who, after 
consulting a solicitor, chose not to dispute the facts of the offense before the 
sheriff as they had before the hearing.373 Parliament, concerned with time spent 
on unnecessary court procedures, expressed its disapproval of the Court of 
Session's holding by amending sections 42(6) and (7) of the Act. 374 The amend-
367. Id.; see also 1981 S.L.T. at 334. 
368. See Forshaw, supra note 34, at 194, 195. 
369. See id. at 194. 
370. Id. 
371. Id. 
372. Kearney, Dispensing with Proof in "Social Work Referrals," 1983 S.L.T. (News) 269. 
373. Id. at 270. 
374. Id. The amendments to the Act consist of the addition of subsection (6A) and modification of 
subsection (7) of section 42 to read as follows: 
(6A) Notwithstanding the provisions of subsection (2)(c) of this section, where, in the course 
of the proceedings before the sheriff, the child and his parent accept any of the grounds in 
respect of which the application has been made, the sheriff may dispense with the hearing of 
evidence relating to that ground unless he is satisfied that in all circumstances such evidence 
should be heard, and deem that ground to have been established for the purposes of this 
section. 
(7) Where a children's hearing are satisfied that the child for any reason is not capable of 
understanding the explanation of the grounds of referral required by subsection (l) of this 
section, or in the course of, or at the conclusion of that explanation, it appears not to be 
understood by the child, the hearing shall, unless they decide to discharge the referral, direct 
the reporter to make application to the sheriff for a finding as to whether any of the grounds 
for the referral have been established, and the provisions of this section relating to an 
application to the sheriff under subsection (2)(c) thereof shall apply as they apply to an 
application under that subsection except that where any of the grounds for the referral are 
accepted by the child's parent, whether or not accepted by the child, then, notwithstanding 
subsection (6A) of this section, the sheriff may dispense with the hearing of evidence relating to 
that ground if he is satisfied that in all the circumstances it would be reasonable to do so. 
Health and Social Services and Social Security Adjudications Act 1983, ch. 41, sched. 2, ~ 8. 
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ments give the sheriff broad discretion to determine whether the court needs to 
hear the evidence in order to establish the grounds of referral.375 
Subsection 6(A) will most often become significant in a case where the child is 
alleged to have committed an offense. The child or the parents may dispute the 
grounds of referral at the hearing, but, after seeking the advice of a solicitor or 
reconsidering the circumstances on their own, both parents and the child may 
decide not to dispute the grounds in the Sheriff Court.376 The sheriff then has 
the discretion either to declare the grounds of referral established or to require 
the reporter to present evidence supporting the referral. 377 The amendment, 
however, gives no guidelines to the sheriff as to the elements to be weighed in 
deciding whether to hear evidence; it merely states that the sheriff should be 
satisfied that all circumstances require the evidence to be heard.37H The elements 
will most likely be the extent to which the sheriff perceives that the child and 
parents understand the full definition of the offense charged, as well as the 
circumstances surrounding the offense.379 The sheriff may also wish to discuss 
with the family outside pressures or considerations (other than the circumstances 
listed in the referral) that may have led to the decision not to dispute the facts. 3so 
In cases involving care or protection rather than juvenile offenses, a sheriff 
considering whether to hear evidence under the new subsection (6A) may have a 
more difficult time determining the criteria to investigate.3s1 This difficulty arises 
from the extent of the types of care or protection referrals, the frequent inability 
of families to understand the implications of such referrals without legal advice, 
and the added consideration established by Kennedy v. B. and Another3S2 that 
evidence regarding a change of circumstances since the hearing is relevant to the 
grounds of referral. 3H3 If the sheriff, after speaking with the family, is not 
convinced that the circumstances support the referral or that the family fully 
understands the act of accepting the stated grounds, the sheriff may request to 
hear the evidence.3H4 
Not only would hearing the proof serve to dispel doubts in the sheriff's mind 
concerning the merits of the case, but, in certain cases, hearing of proof may 
demonstrate to the involved parties that a neutral court has tested and evaluated 
the merits of the case to determine whether further proceedings are necessary.3HS 
375. Kearney. supra note 372. at 270. 
376. [d. 
377. [d. 
378. [d. 
379. [d. at 270-71. 
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It may also show that proceedings in the hearings system are in fact dependent 
on the merits of the referral, despite the family's acquiescence to the merits of 
the referral because of convenience or misunderstood legal advice. 386 This sec-
ond consideration is consistent with the Kilbrandon Committee's goal of en-
lightening the family about the operation of the system and its own situation in 
order to facilitate cooperation between the family and the system. 387 
As amended, section 42(7)388 encompasses primarily care or protection 
cases. 389 Like the cases that fall within subsection 6(A), the sheriff will likely 
consider the parents' understanding of the nature of the referral and their 
motivation behind their decision not to dispute the referral before deciding 
whether to hear evidence on the case.390 The amendment to subsection (7) does 
not eliminate the protection afforded by the court to the child from assenting 
parents who may not share the child's interests; rather, it places the power of 
protection within the discretion of the sheriff to determine when protection is 
necessary for the child's best interests.391 
In sum, Parliament passed the amendments to the Act primarily to avoid 
expenditure of judicial time on cases where the facts are no longer disputed. The 
amendments grant the sheriff discretion to decide whether to hear the evidence 
or whether merely to declare the grounds established. Through the exercise of 
this discretion the sheriff is able to protect both children and parents from 
situations where their assent is not truly voluntary, or where they do not clearly 
understand the consequences of their actions. In such cases, the hearing of proof 
may show the family that the impartial court has tested the merits of the case and 
reached a decision. A family believing that the sheriff had ruled fairly on the 
merits of the case is likely to cooperate with subsequent treatment orders. With 
such cooperation, the treatment has a better chance of working effectively 
against the child's problem. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
This Comment has focused on the effect of some of the Court of Session's 
opinions on procedure in the Children's Hearings System. It has discussed the 
deficiencies in the former Scottish juvenile court system, the reforms proposed 
by the Kilbrandon Committee, and the procedural system implemented to ac-
complish those reforms. The Comment also examined some of the Court of 
Session's opinions on procedural issues and the way in which those opinions have 
386. [d. 
387. KILBRANDON REPORT, supra note 6, ~~ 35, 109. 
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both helped and hindered the implementation of the treatment model of 
juvenile justice. 
The Court of Session's opinion in H. v. McGregor fosters the goal of the 
treatment model by recognizing that both the child and the parents have the 
right to appeal from a final order of the hearing discharging the case. In 
recognizing this additional procedural safeguard, the Court has encouraged the 
prevention of a child's future harm or delinquency by allowing an appeal where 
either party feels that the hearing's decision was imprudent. The prevention of 
delinquency is the goal of the treatment model. 
Likewise, the decision in Kennedy v. B. and Another has fostered the treatment 
model by assuring that the sheriff considers the most recent information rele-
vant to the child's circumstances when ruling on the facts presented. The deci-
sion, however, comes dangerously close to undercutting the structure of the 
hearings system. The Committee recommended the separation of the fact-
finding and treatment forums because it felt that the two processes were incom-
patible. By allowing the sheriff to consider new evidence in deciding whether to 
dismiss the case, the Kennedy decision permits a question of the child's welfare to 
be decided in the fact-finding forum. This procedural anomaly contradicts the 
original intent of the Committee, and, at least hypothetically, allows a family to 
circumvent the treatment forum. 
The opinion in McGregor v. D. contained elements that both foster and frus-
trate the treatment model's ideals. The opinion held that a reporter's failure to 
specify in the referral the exact offense corpmitted is not a valid reason for the 
sheriff to dismiss a referral. Instead, the Court recognized that the sheriff may 
find that any offense supported by the facts of the case had been committed. The 
holding serves to de-emphasize the named offense and allows the sheriff to 
proceed according to the facts of the case. The de-emphasis of the offense, 
however, may only confuse the family and create mistrust in the system. This 
possible effect on the family frustrates the Kilbrandon Committee's goal of 
creating a system which can win the trust and cooperation of those whom it 
purports to serve. 
Finally, inJ.F. and Others v. McGregor, the Court attempted to ensure that a 
child's interests are protected despite the child's own lack of understanding 
about the case. Protection of the child's best interest is crucial to the treatment 
model, but in its attempt to extend this protection, the Court made its holding 
too broad. This overly broad holding resulted in many unnecessary appeals to 
the sheriff and precipitated a parliamentary amendment. 
The amendments to section 42 of the Social Work (Scotland) Act demon-
strated Parliament's concern for the smooth functioning of the Children's Hear-
ings System and its willingness to act against unfavorable procedural rulings by 
the Court of Session. Although the 1983 amendments are the only actions in this 
regard, Parliament seems not to have conceded to the Court of Session the final 
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word on procedural interpretation. At least some of the procedural gaps in the 
original Act need to be remedied through the legislative rather than the judicial 
process. Parliament is not likely to amend the Act routinely in response to the 
Court's decisions, but the recent amendments indicate that Parliament shares the 
responsibility with the Scottish courts to preserve the principles of the treatment 
model and the foundation of the Children's Hearings System. 
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